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The work of Michel Serres, if considered at all, is often presented as a radical 
break with or criticism of the work of Gaston Bachelard. This is sometimes also 
endorsed by Serres himself, who in an interview stated:
Yes, I wrote my thesis under Bachelard, but l thought privately that the 
“new scientific spirit” coming into fashion at that time lagged way behind 
the sciences. ... The model it offered of the sciences could not, for me, 
pass as contemporary. This new spirit seemed to me quite old. And so, this 
milieu was not mine.1
Bruno Latour, in a similar vein, has described Serres as the anti-Bachelard.2 Within 
this context the project of Bachelard is described as a naive belief in the rational-
ity of science or as a misguided project to purify science from all non-scientific el-
ements. For instance, in his own work, Latour, inspired by Serres, uses Bachelard 
as the perfect illustration of the paradox of modernity he is attacking: 
Gaston Bachelard’s dual enterprise—which […] exaggerates the objectiv-
ity of the sciences by dint of breaking with common sense, and symmetri-
surrationalism after bachelard · 61 
cally exaggerates the objectless power of the imaginary by dint of episte-
mological breaks—offers the perfect symbol for this impossible crisis, this 
drawing and quartering.3
This image, however, is too simplistic and in fact makes us unable to really appre-
ciate what we can learn from the work of Bachelard today. As Christiane Frémont 
correctly notes, “from a genuine post-bachelardian one has too hastily made Mi-
chel Serres into an anti-bachelardian.”4 A more interesting picture comes forward 
if one goes beyond such a simple but radical opposition between Bachelard and 
Serres. Instead one could focus on a few, but essential continuities between both 
authors. 
Precisely by focusing on Serres’s interaction with Bachelard in his early work, a 
core element of the Bachelardian project that is still at work in Serres’s philoso-
phy and remains relevant for contemporary discussions will be highlighted. This 
does not mean that Bachelard and Serres fundamentally agree on many let alone 
all topics. On the contrary, clear differences must be recognized, for instance how 
Serres has developed a radically different ontology focused on the role of objects. 
This paper thus deals most of all with the early Serres, without discussing his 
more recent positions and his general ontology of quasi-objects in detail. The aim 
is rather to understand how Serres’s break with Bachelard and French epistemol-
ogy in general was produced by an intimate dialogue with this tradition.5 
In this paper, the claim is precisely that clear disagreements concerning topics 
such as rationalism or the role of objects do not contradict a certain methodologi-
cal continuity between both authors. It is this methodological aspect of Bachelard 
that, by still being at work in Serres’s philosophy, remains relevant today. In the 
first part, I will discuss the case of Gaston Bachelard, especially his surrationalism 
and his philosophie du non. Secondly, I will use this reading of Bachelard to shed 
a new light on the specific criticisms Serres raised against him. The claim is that, 
instead of abandoning Bachelard’s perspective, Serres’s criticisms, even when one 
acknowledges clear discontinuities in content, can be understood as a radicaliza-
tion of certain methodological elements at work in Bachelard.
2 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE OF GASTON BACHELARD
There are many different possible attitudes in the philosophy of science. To grasp 
what is specific to Bachelard’s, it is useful to contrast it in a rather schematic way 
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to how philosophy of science is traditionally understood. If one refers to histori-
cal examples such as Logical Positivism and its attempts to promote verification-
ism or confirmation theory, philosophy of science seems to be about formulating 
criteria for how science is a rational process. Bachelard’s project is, however, dif-
ferent in several respects. First of all, projects such as Logical Positivism aim to 
conceptualize a timeless model of science, i.e. a model that would work for any 
specific moment in science whatsoever. Secondly, their aim is to propose norms 
for how science should behave rather than how it factually behaves. In this sense 
the philosopher has the task of dictating to the scientist how to do science. 
2.1 Surrationalism and the primacy of science
The program that we can find in Bachelard is rather different. Its aim is similar 
in the sense that it wants to understand scientific practices, but it must be seen 
as part of a bigger project, namely trying to understand how human rationality 
works by ‘writing the history of the mind.’6 In fact, in twentieth-century France 
there was hardly a distinction between philosophy and history of science in the 
first place. Rather, they have always been intimately related to one another.7 Cen-
tral to philosophy of science in France is the idea that to understand the rational-
ity of science and the functioning of the human mind, one cannot start from the 
traditional a priori way. One always has to look at the history of the sciences to see 
the rational movement of thought. 
An important reason why such authors as Bachelard follow this approach, must be 
linked to the foundational crisis in mathematics and the scientific revolutions in 
physics at the beginning of the 20th century.8 For many philosophers these crises 
showed that the traditional assumption of an atemporal and ultimate foundation 
for knowledge and rationality was not so self-evident. How can we still be sure 
that our beliefs are rational if there can be such historical breaks and revolutions 
even in mathematics or physics? Projects such as Frege’s or Russell’s Logicism or 
Husserlian phenomenology can be understood as responses to these crises and 
attempts to find new firm foundations for all rational beliefs.9 
Following Castelli Gattinara, one could state that in France a different approach 
was taken. Rather than trying to look for a firm foundation underneath the dust 
of scientific revolutions, authors such as Bachelard claimed that rationality was to 
be found within the revolutionary act itself. Instead of seeing historicity as a problem 
for rationality, it was seen as the ground for rationality itself: science was rational 
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not despite its historical shifts, but because of the historical shifts, which were 
deemed to be rational stages of scientific thinking.10 Exactly, the dialectics of the 
history of science proved the sciences to be rational.
Now, in the case of Bachelard this is argued for in the name of an ‘open rational-
ism’ (rationalisme ouvert) or what he calls a surrationalism.11 For Bachelard ratio-
nalism does not imply that one should start from a number of fixed cognitive 
categories. The latter he calls a ‘closed rationalism,’ where the forms thought can 
take are fixed for eternity and in fact limit the way we can think and do science. 
One could think of a simple Kantian scheme, where rationality is defined by time-
less categories of understanding. An open rationalism, on the other hand, starts 
from the idea that the act of rationality lies within the overcoming of the catego-
ries of thought by creating novel ones, if deemed necessary by the developments 
of science. Bachelard argues to
place reason inside the crisis, to prove that the function of reason is to pro-
voke crises and that the polemic reason, to which Kant had only attributed 
a subalternate role, cannot leave the architectonic reason with its contem-
plations. We should thus gain access to an open Kantianism, a functional 
Kantianism, a non-Kantianism, in the same way as one speaks of a non-
Euclidian geometry.12
In this sense, similar to the subversive nature of surrealism, surrationalism aims 
to break with conservative tendencies to stick with old categories of thinking. 
Surrationalism precisely creates the room for scientific practices to redefine our 
cognitive categories. For Bachelard “science instructs reason. Reason has to obey 
science, a more evolved science, an evolving science.”13 Thus we find in Bachelard 
the distinctive idea of the primacy of science over philosophy: philosophy should 
not dictate or supervise a normativity of science, but rather learn from the norms 
internal to the sciences themselves.14
Against the closed rationalism of the philosophers, Bachelard aims to mobilize an 
open rationalism. This openness, however, is not found within traditional philo-
sophical activity, but within the scientific practices. As a consequence, there ex-
ists a broader tension between philosophy and science within Bachelard’s oeuvre. 
For him, scientists continually revise their own categories, while philosophers 
tend to be conservative about them.15 Philosophers wrongly try “to apply neces-
sarily finalist and closed philosophy to open scientific thought.”16 For Bachelard, 
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the sciences never follow the clear-cut and given philosophical categories. Rather 
they create their own novel categories because “science ordains philosophy by 
itself.”17 Or as he states, “[e]very philosophical mind who puts himself in study-
ing science would see how much of contemporary science is philosophical in its 
core.”18 Given philosophical categories are in fact never a solution, but always a 
problem. This is related to Bachelard’s idea that the formation of the scientific 
mind consists in an epistemological rupture with everyday experience:
We believe, in fact, that scientific progress always shows itself in a rupture, 
in continuous ruptures, between ordinary knowledge and scientific knowl-
edge, as soon as one is faced with an evolved science, a science which, due 
to the these ruptures themselves, carries the mark of modernity.19
This break implies a break with psychologically tempting images about the sci-
entific object, but also with spontaneous philosophical theories about science. 
“The scientific mind consists precisely in the bracketing of the first philosophy 
[la philosophie première]. Just as the experimental activity, the philosophy linked 
to the scientific activity must be nuanced and, as a consequence, be mobile.”20 But 
traditional philosophy of science does not do this, and therefore “science does 
not have the philosophy it deserves.”21 And this is precisely what Bachelard aims 
to create in his own work, a surrationalism respecting the openness that is active 
within scientific practices. In this sense, “epistemology must thus be as flexible 
as science.”22 The implication is that to really grasp what is going on in scientific 
practices, looking at the history and development of these sciences becomes a 
necessity.
In this section we have seen that for Bachelard the relation between philosophy 
and science is mainly described in a negative way: one should follow the sciences 
and rather than starting from some given philosophical assumptions, but search 
for the currently adequate philosophical categories within the sciences them-
selves. The results depend on the specific scientific field under consideration. 
Which philosophical categories the philosopher ends up with, depends on the 
field or even the concept in question. 
In this sense, the lesson to be drawnis methodological: the concepts must be the 
product of the historical data, rather than the other way around. In this way it is 
a plea for a genuine conceptual flexibility in philosophical categories. Moreover, 
in order to do this the philosopher can rely on the philosophical activity at work 
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within the sciences themselves. Not only will this allow the philosopher to bet-
ter understand the historical case studies he or she is examining, but “we believe 
rather that it is at the level of particular examples that philosophy of science can 
give us general lessons.”23
2.2 Scientific practice and philosophie du non
At the same time, however, there is a clear normative idea of scientific progress at 
work in Bachelard’s work. One of his central starting points is that within history 
of science it is always inevitable to make normative judgments from the present 
perspective. In this respect, Bachelard contrasts the work of the epistemologist 
with that of the common historian. The historian looks for facts, and accumulates 
them in his study without making any normative judgment. This model, however, 
does not work for the history of science, because “it does not take into account 
the fact that every historian of science is necessarily a historiographer of Truth 
[de la Vérité]. The events of science are connected in an ever-increasing truth.”24 
According to Bachelard, such normativity is necessary and meaningful. He ac-
knowledges that reading the history of science as a teleological process, where 
historical episodes must be seen as necessary steps or obstacles with the present 
as their goal, is problematic. But he distinguishes this from the claim that if one 
wants to do proper historiography of science it is unavoidable to rewrite the his-
tory of science from what is presently seen as scientific and what is not.25 
At the same time, however, there is a clear notion of historical discontinuity about 
science in Bachelard’s oeuvre. This is the famous epistemological rupture men-
tioned above. This rupture not only implies a break between spontaneous and 
scientific concepts, but also historical breaks within the sciences themselves. 
Claiming that the scientific revolutions at the beginning of the 20th century imply 
a ‘new scientific spirit,’ Bachelard argues that there exists a radical discontinuity 
between Newton and Einstein. “One thus cannot correctly say that the Newto-
nian world prefigures in its main lines the Einsteinian world.”26
At first sight the combination of such a normative framework and historical dis-
continuities seems problematic. How can contemporary scientific categories be 
relevant to a past with which scientific practices have broken? Both elements, 
however are not irreconcilable for Bachelard, but precisely imply each other if one 
understands what scientific progress is all about. In his book Philosophie du non 
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(1940) Bachelard argues that historical progress in science is not made in a con-
tinuous manner, but rather through breaks. As stated above, it is precisely in these 
historical shifts that the scientific mind shows its rationality. But the products 
of these shifts as well have a specific character, that Bachelard tries to capture 
through his ‘philosophie du non.’
For Bachelard, the sciences progress through a model of incorporation: there is a 
radical shift in scientific revolutions, but one where the previous theories are not 
completely abandoned, but rather reappraised and translated into particular and 
approximate cases of the new theories. “The philosophie du non will therefore be 
not an attitude of refusal, but an attitude of conciliation.”27 The example he uses 
is that of non-Euclidean geometry, which never disproved classical Euclidean ge-
ometry, but reappraised it as a specific case of a broader framework. “The gener-
alization by the no must include what it denies. In fact, the whole rise of scientific 
thought in the last century has come from such dialectical generalizations result-
ing in the incorporation of what one denies.”28 It is in this manner that he speaks 
of quantum mechanics as a non-Newtonian physics and of his own epistemology 
as a non-Cartesian epistemology.29
The history of science, thus, follows a progressive dialectical movement, which is 
fundamentally open-ended. The epistemologist must follow and grasp this move-
ment. “The progress is the dynamics itself of scientific culture, and it is this dy-
namics that the history of science must describe.”30 For Bachelard this results in a 
distinction between lapsed history (histoire périmée) and sanctioned history (his-
toire sanctionnée). Since the history of science is not continuous, but cumulative, 
this implies also the dismissal of certain parts of science. The former is therefore 
used as a term for these parts of science that, from the contemporary perspective, 
are excluded as non-science, while the latter refers to those elements that are 
preserved.
Bachelard thus endorses a specific form of ‘presentism.’31 Such a normative pre-
sentism is quite problematic for many contemporary historians of science and 
will also be heavily criticized by Serres. However, I want to argue that in the light 
of Bachelard’s surrationalism, Serres’s critique should not be understood as a 
radical break with Bachelard, but rather as an internal dispute about this method-
ological principle: is Bachelard’s presentism not in conflict with the very idea of 
the openness of surrationalism?
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But to see why Bachelard endorses this presentism, one must situate it in the 
light of the other goals of his philosophy. First of all, as stated above, the goal of 
French epistemologists such as Bachelard is broader than history of science, but 
implies the writing of a history of the rational mind. The main objective is not just 
to grasp specific historical facts, but rather the above mentioned surrationalism 
and the flexibility of the mind. Secondly, for Bachelard there is also a clear peda-
gogical task present in its philosophy of science.32 Describing the struggle of past 
science with certain epistemological obstacles, such as ordinary experience and 
naive philosophical theories, is necessary in order to prevent new students of sci-
ence from possible missteps, confusions and false theories. History of science, for 
Bachelard, therefore is not only valuable per se, but serves the “formation of the 
scientific mind.”33 It is therefore also insufficient to write a so-called ‘Whiggish’ 
history of science, where the past works teleologically towards the present (let 
alone see Bachelard’s own project as an example of this). Such an approach fails 
to appreciate how contemporary scientific theories are not self-evident, but imply 
certain breaks with ordinary experience and spontaneous philosophy.
3. MICHEL SERRES’S CRITIQUE OF BACHELARD
In the previous sections we saw how Bachelard conceives of the relationship be-
tween science and philosophy. Now that Bachelard’s approach has been made 
clear, we can reexamine the case of Michel Serres and see that the picture of 
Serres as an anti-Bachelardian has its limits. On the contrary, this reexamination 
will allow us to stress some interesting continuities at work between the two, hid-
den beneath the more visible disagreements.
Although relating both authors is not self-evident, there are in fact several simi-
larities to pinpoint. But before going into that, first the question must be raised 
what precisely is meant with the claim that Bachelard has influenced Serres. This 
claim might first of all mean that Serres’s early philosophy has been greatly shaped 
by the way philosophy of science was taught in the 1950s. The way philosophy of 
science was conceived in France at that time was indeed strongly defined by the 
work of Bachelard. The typical combination of philosophy and history of science, 
for example, is found in both authors. But also a clearly constructivist perspective 
can be found in Bachelard as well as in Serres, focusing not on how the scientist 
passively studies nature, but rather on how (s)he actively intervenes in nature and 
‘constructs’ the phenomena.
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Serres might thus be Bachelardian in a rather indirect way, namely through the 
intellectual climate or through other French historical epistemologists such as 
Georges Canguilhem, or even through the work of Louis Althusser and Michel 
Foucault.34 But Bachelard himself in particular played a more prominent role, be-
sides being the reference point within discussions about philosophy of science 
in France. Serres himself was (a) first of all a direct pupil of him, since Serres 
“wrote [his] thesis under the direction of Bachelard, on the difference between 
the Bourbaki algebraic method and that of the classical mathematicians who had 
gone before.” 35 Moreover, (b) Serres discusses Bachelard extensively in his early 
work, and even in later interviews concerning his philosophical influences. The 
result is then also that (c) several key concepts were developed in direct dialogue 
with Bachelard himself. It is for these reasons that it seems warranted to speak of 
the Bachelardism of Serres.
Besides such simple continuities there are, however, more substantial links in 
methodology to highlight. For instance, following new developments within phys-
ics, Serres develops a non-determinist physics, where the starting point is not 
order but disorder.36 Clearly, this is in fundamental disagreement with how Bach-
elard understood physics. However, at the same time this can be seen as a next 
step in the Bachelardian conception of the development of science, namely that 
of the above philosophie du non. Similar to how Euclidean mathematics became a 
borderline case of non-Euclidean mathematics, Serres develops a perspective in 
which the old physics is an exceptional case in a broader framework where disor-
der is the rule. “Order is not the norm, but is the exception.”37 Or as Ilya Prigogine 
and Isabelle Stengers comment on Serres’s philosophy: “There are the rare ones 
in which determinism exists as a limit-state, costly but conceivable, in which ex-
trapolation is possible between the approximate description of any observer and 
the infinitely precise one of which Leibniz’s God is capable.”38 The philosophie 
du non can thus be found in Serres’s reading of contemporary history of science 
as well. Even though Bachelard and Serres clearly disagree on the content, on a 
methodological level Serres’s distinct view on physics can be seen as loyal to the 
Bachelardian framework.
Even more telling, however, is that not only the philosophie du non, but also Bach-
elard’s surrationalism is recognizable in Serres. To dig up this similarity, let’s take 
a closer look at what Serres is criticizing Bachelard for:
surrationalism after bachelard · 69 
Yes, l wrote my thesis under Bachelard, but l thought privately that the 
“new scientific spirit” coming into fashion at that time lagged way behind 
the sciences. Behind mathematics, because, instead of speaking of algebra, 
topology, and the theory of sets, it referred to non-Euclidean geometries, 
not all that new. Likewise, it lagged behind physics, since it never said a 
word about information theory nor, later, heard the sound of Hiroshima. 
It also lagged behind logic, and so on. The model it offered of the sciences 
could not, for me, pass as contemporary. This new spirit seemed to me 
quite old. And so, this milieu was not mine.39 
At first sight, it seems that, according to Serres, the whole idea of Bachelard, that 
in contemporary physics there is a new scientific spirit at work which calls for 
revisions in philosophy is problematic. Talking about such an epistemological 
break, as Bachelard tends to do, is not the right approach. But if one looks closely, 
Serres is not claiming that there have been no shifts at all that call for our philo-
sophical attention. Rather, he seems to claim that Bachelard is lagging behind the 
newest developments, since in mathematics for instance, “instead of speaking of 
algebra, topology, and the theory of sets, it referred to non-Euclidean geometries, 
not all that new.” The problem is not that Bachelard claimed that there was an 
epistemological break, but that he did not see all the breaks, or the newest ones. 
In a way then, we could say, Serres accuses Bachelard of not being bachelardian 
enough, of not being loyal enough to his surrationalism. 
Taking this surrationalism of Bachelard as a starting point, the three main criti-
cisms of Serres to Bachelard can be reexamined. The first criticism is already hint-
ed at above, namely that Bachelard did not live up to his own standards, because 
he had not followed the most recent scientific developments that Serres himself 
witnessed. “I had the chance to witness, in real time, three or four big scientific 
revolutions: modern mathematics, biochemistry, information theory and, later 
on, in Silicon Valley, the digital one.”40 Not only does Serres want to open up 
this epistemological project even further, but he also aims to write about a new 
new scientific spirit [nouveau nouvel esprit scientifique].41 Serres claims to follow the 
sciences even more closely, radicalising a flexibility that even Bachelard lacked. 
Secondly, these new developments in the sciences result in a shifting role for the 
philosopher, since the new sciences produce their own internal epistemology. Fi-
nally, the problem is not only that the philosopher cannot be an epistemologist 
anymore, but also that by trying to be merely an epistemologist, he or she misses 
the whole political dimension of science. Epistemologists such as Bachelard failed 
70 · massimiliano simons 
to hear “the sound of Hiroshima” and Serres tries to correct this. Although these 
three criticisms seem quite radical, they can, however, all be seen in the light of 
a surrationalist move. In this sense, the claim can be defended that precisely in 
criticizing the content of Bachelard’s project, Serres remains loyal to its method-
ology.
3.1 A new new scientific spirit
As was clear from Serres’s description, Bachelard’s epistemology is not yet open 
enough and in the end reduces science to practices that have to wait for an epis-
temology to speak out their truth. In that sense, Serres’s early work consists in 
a correction of this element within the Bachelardian project. Serres considers 
himself well-placed and even obliged to describe this new new scientific spirit 
because his own training came not from philosophers, but “consisted in witness-
ing—almost participating in—a profound change in this fundamental science” 
while “the epistemologists didn’t follow.”42 
This new new scientific spirit is mainly inspired by information theory, topology 
and mathematical structuralism. According to Serres it consists in an ontological 
shift, resulting in a new ontology that will also prove to be fundamental to his 
later philosophy.43 It leads to a worldview where not only humans possess and 
transmit information, but where this can be generalized to all possible relations 
and objects:
There is a constant and continuous dialogue between things which form the his-
torical fabric of events and laws, among whom my intervention is exceptional […] 
The general informational language is the fundamental and continuous relation 
between objects. Even before their deciphering, the certainty that it exists in-
duces the certainty that the external world exists, in the mode of a communicat-
ing network, of which all the networks I know and could constitute are singular, 
exceptional cases, approximating to imitate the real world.44 
Secondly, following the generalization of this ontological claim, Serres also prob-
lematizes Bachelard’s profound distinction between science and culture, the ra-
tional and the imaginary. Inspired by the promises of structuralism, Serres seems 
to ask: a new method is made possible, one that “excludes nothing; better yet, it 
attempts to include everything […] So why would I exclude literature?”45 Only an 
a priori distinction can prevent us from making this move, a criterion imposed by 
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philosophers from the outside. Again, however, it is by simultaneously dismiss-
ing the content of Bachelard’s point of view, but radicalizing his methodological 
principle that we get there.
At several moments, Serres portrays himself as the next step in completing Bach-
elard’s work. In the first book in his Hermes series, Serres labels Bachelard as the 
last of the classical projects in literary criticism and the first of the structuralist 
ones: “the contemporary idea of critique defines itself relatively easily as a pas-
sage to the limit of the Bachelardian incompleteness.”46 Starting as it does from 
the opposition between symbolic analyses of images and rationalist studies of 
truth, Bachelard’s double oeuvre is portrayed as the radicalization of this distinc-
tion to the moment where it implodes: the symbolic analyses of the most ab-
stracts myths, namely the archetypes of nature (fire, water, earth, air). The study 
of the imaginary then implies a natural history and the study of science a psycho-
analysis of images. “To a false (and original) alchemy correspond true dreams, to 
a true (and actual) chemistry correspond false images.”47 Bachelard is the first to 
combine both projects in one philosophy, but they remain irreconcilable.
Very similarly, in his second Hermes book, Serres describes a three stage process: 
from the subjective-subjective stage of Descartes, through the subjective-objec-
tive stage of Bachelard to the objective-objective stage of the new new scientific 
spirit.48 Serres starts from the ‘wax’ example of Descartes, which is subjective-
subjective for him since both the sender (the wax) and the receiver of informa-
tion (the cogito) possess no fixed and objective information, but rather infor-
mation that is unreliable and ever changing for Descartes. For Bachelard, on the 
other hand, the world is an undetermined realm of complexity and it is the subject 
that aided by concepts plus a phénoménotechnique imposes a certain rigor and thus 
reliable information on the object. By purifying it from the subjective images re-
lated to color or smell, one makes objectivity possible. However, in the light of 
the above mentioned ontological shift, the new new scientific spirit goes one step 
further and is objective-objective, since both the one who studies and that what 
is being studied can possess, transmit and receive real and reliable information. 
“The third stage, one must call objective-objective, since it tends to decipher the 
language that objects apply to objects, by reconstituting, when it is possible, the 
objective language.”49 This real information is not limited to the rational side, 
purified from subjective experiences, but rather consists of both primary and sec-
ondary qualities in the object as well as in the subject. One returns to the things 
themselves; a stage where history and physics, culture and science become one. 50
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The new new scientific spirit thus results in one method to study science and 
culture rather than in two separated methods. This leads to the typical Serresian 
readings of authors such as Jules Verne or Émile Zola, in whose work Serres finds 
the genesis of contemporary scientific theories such as thermodynamics. It is also 
in this context that one should understand Serres’s suggestion that “the most sci-
entific works, most instructed works of Bachelard, would they be concerned with 
the poetic elements? Would we find here written, through a method of negation 
and denial, the prophecies of the new new scientific spirit?”51 According to Serres, 
hidden within the books concerned with the imaginary, Bachelard opens up a per-
spective that articulates how the material things can impose their information 
on our minds. Our imagination must therefore not be seen as independent of the 
world, but rather as part of and in relation to the networks of the world.
However, it is important to note that the claim is not that Zola, for instance, was 
equally or even better aware of scientific developments than the scientists. Rath-
er, the idea seems to be that one cannot start from a clear distinction between 
science and culture, but should be as flexible as the texts themselves. Scientific 
theories and ideas can be developed within literary texts as well. Not because 
there is a hidden layer of scientificity in these texts, but rather because both are 
part of one network, that is not fundamentally broken in two.52
Neither does this imply some form of radical relativism, where a scientific prac-
tice, theory or text is completely similar to mythical, political or cultural texts. 
This is definitely not Serres’s. He would certainly stress the difference between a 
scientific practice and other practices, but never in a radical, ontological and a pri-
ori way. Claiming that science distinguishes itself by a form of rationalism, even an 
open one, is already imposing a certain philosophical category on science, namely 
that of rationality. Instead, Serres wants to separate the question of the rational-
ity of the sciences (which is actually rather an answer than a question) from the 
underlying question of what one could, following Stengers, call the singularity of 
the sciences: what is the specificity of scientific practices that distinguishes them 
from other types of practices?53 Referring to the rationality of these practices is a 
possible answer to this question, but one that cannot be given a priori. Instead, 
one should follow the sciences, even through myths and literary texts, rather than 
delineating from beforehand what the limits of the sciences are.54 In this sense 
there is a clear discontinuity with Bachelard, namely by abandoning the whole 
notion of rationality. Of the surrationalism, it is the sur-, the open movement that 
remains at work in Serres, while he abandons the rationalism.
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It is in this light that one, thirdly, has to understand the radical shift in how to read 
the history of science. Serres disagrees with the picture sketched above by Bach-
elard, that there are clear epistemological ruptures that break with the imaginary 
part of our thinking and that there is a meaningful distinction to make between 
lapsed history and sanctioned history. Such an a priori imposing a philosophical 
dichotomy precludes us from following the sciences in their totality. It prevents 
us, for example, to see ‘contemporary’ science at work in the work of authors such 
as Lucretius. In his book on Lucretius, Serres tries exactly to show how his work, 
often seen as part of lapsed history, has reemerged as relevant for contemporary 
fluid mechanics. “Scientific modernity does not enter history by a fault or a break, 
but by the revival of a philosophy of nature that has been spreading ever since 
Antiquity. The so-called break is an artefact of the university.”55
The new new scientific spirit thus results in an alternative epistemology of sci-
ence, which could be called the model of proliferation. Although we will not go into 
details, the central idea is that the objectivity and rationality of science is strength-
ened if it is linked to more elements and connections. Elements of literature and 
imagination can thus play a positive role in the production of knowledge. This is 
opposed to the model of purification, ascribed to Bachelard, where science becomes 
more objective if it is purified from imagination and epistemological obstacles. 
But there is an ambiguity here, in the case of Serres. He characterizes science 
which follows the model of purification as repressive of an original multiplicity. 
“Let this scientific knowledge get rid of its arrogance, its masterly, its ecclesial 
dispensation, let it abandon its martial aggressiveness, the hateful pretension of 
always being right, so that it speaks truth, that it descends, pacified, towards com-
mon knowledge.”56
At the same time, Serres claims that this multiplicity can be adequately articu-
lated in his own model of proliferation. In his book on Lucretius, for instance, 
Serres claims that modern physics is closed off in laboratories, while the fluid 
mechanics found in Lucretius works also outside, capable to grasp the multiplic-
ity of the world itself.57 His book has indeed been read as “a story in which physics 
neither represses (through experimentation) nor manipulates nature.”58 Serres, 
thus, paradoxically, believes to have found a model that is no model, a model that 
contrary to all other models does not reduce, repress, push into categories the 
original multiplicity found in nature.
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But such a belief in a ‘model without a model’ seems unwarranted. A more plau-
sible view is to acknowledge that all models imply some form of violence towards 
their objects, but not all in the same way. The model of purification, thus, can be 
criticized for implying a repression of the purified phenomena, but the model of 
proliferation is itself not free from this violence. It (hopefully) implies less vio-
lence or violence of a more acceptable sort. But again, to evaluate this, it is prob-
ably necessary to relate the issue to the specific phenomena one is talking about. 
Serres speaks about whirlpools or climate models. For these phenomena a model 
of purification seems problematic, indeed. But perhaps Bachelard’s model of pu-
rification can still be applied to a number of cases, such as quantum mechanics or 
the theory of relativity. Again, one might mobilize Bachelard’s philosophie du non: 
we can interpret the model of proliferation not as complete dismissal of that of 
purification, but instead as a model of non-purification, where classical purifica-
tion remains a limiting case in the broader framework.59
3.2 A new image of the philosopher
The second crucial element is that the new new scientific spirit also forces Serres 
to accept a new role of the philosopher. First of all, Serres introduces a new term 
to describe the philosopher. The model that Serres prefers is that of the encyclope-
dist, collecting different sciences and types of knowledge, without reducing them 
or forcing them in a strict hierarchy. Rather they are situated next to one another, 
with the everlasting possibility of cross-references.60 “Science is, on and for itself, 
a collection of dictionaries: The Encyclopedia.”61 In this sense, we should correct 
our claim that Serres follows the model of the philosophie du non. The model of 
the encyclopedia is a different, yet radicalized version of the philosophie du non. 
First of all, in the sense that, although regional rationalisms are clearly also pres-
ent in Bachelard, in the case of Serres these regional criteria for knowledge and 
truth are also internally developed by the sciences rather than conceptualized by 
epistemology (see below).62 Secondly, the model of the Encyclopedia starts from 
a different image than that of conciliation and dialectics. “The new spirit focused 
itself in a philosophy of no; the new new spirit develops itself in a philosophy of 
transport: intersection, intervention, interception.”63 Again information theory is 
the paradigm here, for instance in the case of molecular biology. What molecular 
biologists show is that in genetics one should not search for the ‘noumena’ under-
lying our biological beings, the invisible behind the visible, but rather the univer-
sality of the genetic code.64 Notions from information theory are thus translated, 
and at the same time transformed, when applied to a different scientific region, 
surrationalism after bachelard · 75 
in this case biology. 
The encyclopedist, moreover, is not just the Bachelardian epistemologist updated 
by insights from the contemporary sciences. There is a second and more impor-
tant revision at work, namely that the newest developments within the sciences 
have also resulted in a qualitative shift in the sciences themselves, problematizing 
this traditional image of the epistemologist. Serres radicalizes Bachelard’s claim 
that the sciences themselves produce philosophical categories, by claiming that 
they now also produce their own epistemology. Serres characterizes these new 
mature sciences as autoregulative or “autonormée[s].”65 Serres makes this claim 
first of all for mathematics:
At all moments of grand systematic reconstruction, the mathematicians 
become the epistemologists of their own knowledge. This transformation 
is a mutation that is carried out from the inside out. Everything happens 
as if, at the moment of promoting itself into a new system, mathematics 
suddenly needed to import the totality of epistemological questions.66 
In other passages he makes similar remarks about contemporary physics, for in-
stance about the work of Léon Brillouin, Science and information theory (1956). 
“The philosophers do not have to search nor write a manual where one would find 
the epistemology of the experimental knowledge. It is there.”67 This has crucial 
consequences for the task of the philosopher. The idea is that, even if the tradi-
tional epistemological project succeeds and one is able to describe the scientific 
practice in a genuine way, one would only be repeating the sciences themselves. 
If so, in what sense, then, does the “philosopher’s work differ from that of a jour-
nalistic chronicler, who announces and comments on the news?”68 Or more pre-
cisely, the philosopher is confronted with a fundamental choice, which Serres at 
one moment compares to literary criticism. The literary critic either can choose 
to describe the text as loyally as possible, but he will end up in a philological exer-
cise that will not really add anything significant; or else he tries to be more specu-
lative, but he loses himself in an uncertain art of describing, linked to a certain 
normative framework. So either the epistemologist merely repeats the sciences or 
he becomes speculative, in that case implying a tension with the original idea of 
the primacy of science.69 Here already it is clear that it is precisely by pushing the 
traditional Bachelardian project to its boundaries that Serres arrives at one of his 
fundamental differences with Bachelard: if one would really take the surrational-
ism of Bachelard seriously, than one can no longer unproblematically write the 
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books Bachelard wrote.
3.3 From an epistemology to a political philosophy
However, Serres does not chooses to give up all speculative ambition, but rather 
the opposite. One can never escape the speculative element, and it is therefore 
necessary to be explicit about it. For Serres, this means opening up for the po-
litical side of science as well. An encyclopedist would only add something to the 
internal epistemology of the sciences if he or she would speak of more than mere 
epistemology. “To speak the truth, my interest in the relations between science 
and society marked at the same time my difficulties with philosophy, and, most 
of all, with Canguilhem and Bachelard. They were out of their time. How could 
one teach epistemology of physics while omitting deontology?”70 Serres thus goes 
further than a mere epistemology in the traditional sense, switching to a political 
project, which aims to correct Bachelard’s project by articulating the political vio-
lence of the sciences as well. But even this break can be read as playing out Bach-
elard’s own cards against himself: if you really want to pursue an open philosophy, 
then you must also make room for the political and violent dimensions of science. 
It is, however, incorrect if one would interpret this claim as saying that a political 
project is completely absent in the case of Bachelard, but present in that of Serres. 
To the contrary, in a famous essay “The Reformation and the Seven Sins” (see 
this issue) Serres argues that in Bachelard’s oeuvre there was always something 
like a political project. This project is exactly his presentism, the fact of looking 
for epistemological obstacles and epistemological breaks. For Serres, the model 
of purification is not only crippled epistemology but a crypto-normative project 
as well. It is a normative ideal where true science is seen as that which purifies 
itself from all the obstacles, from imagination, from myth. The Formation of the 
scientific mind (1938) of Bachelard is not (only) a description of scientific practice, 
but a political project of how the scientific city should be arranged, namely one 
with clear and strong walls against imagination, in favor of a spiritual purification 
of the scientist. Against this Serres states that “a totally purified reason is a myth” 
and that in fact “there is no purer myth than the idea of a science purified from all 
myth.”71 Exactly at this point, and once again, the model of proliferation will have 
to be introduced: it is through the creation of relations, not their destruction, that 
science comes about.
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Does this mean that philosophers should give up normative ambitions completely 
according to Serres? Although it might seem so, this is not a necessary conse-
quence. Indeed, refraining from giving a distorted reading of his epistemological 
project, Bachelard himself is not saying that one should use abstract philosophi-
cal distinctions to judge the history of science. Not at all, in fact he is claiming 
that the norms he uses originate in the scientific practices themselves, namely 
those imposed by the present sciences. Serres’s claim is not that one should stop 
using norms, but rather that one should be wary in what way one bases oneself 
on certain norms. The problem with Bachelard is not that he judges, but that by 
judging in his sense, he also endorses a certain political project embodied in the 
sciences, namely one that makes a distinction between a science that knows and 
a non-science that does not. It implies a reaffirmation of the political power of 
the sciences, of Modernity over non-modern elements (suspicions, non-western 
peoples, religion, etc.). One should—at least analytically—separate within surra-
tionalism the epistemological project (the sur-) from the political one (the ratio-
nalism). One should be aware that one is doing both at the same time. 
It is this double project Serres has in mind when he adds that the new scientific 
spirit of Bachelard not only ignored the scientific developments but also had not 
“heard the sound of Hiroshima.”72 Serres is puzzled by the paradox that something 
as rational as science can lead to something as irrational as the atomic bomb. In 
this context he makes some very strong claims, such as that “humanity is col-
lectively suicidal” and that we live in a thanatocracy, a government of death.73 By 
these scientific developments, the whole world is in danger, because we are faced 
with what Serres calls world-objects, objects that span a whole dimension of the 
world (e.g. ballistic missiles span space; satellites span Earth’s rotation; nuclear 
waste spans time, etc.).74
In the second place, the development of science is also reflected in a trend to-
wards codification and secrecy, resulting in a science where “the foundation of 
scientific rationality is being destroyed.”75 Since scientific practices are auto-nor-
mative, they must be able to control themselves through critical inquiry. By lock-
ing up science in secrecy and national interests, one destroys this practice. Or as 
Serres states:
There is knowledge, but the open possibility of feedback control has de-
creased sharply, almost towards its final dissolution. However, from the 
moment there is no longer any control, counter-role, there is no longer any 
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rationality. The total of the network of scientific interferences does not 
have the possibility to control itself; although, that was its proper reason.76
In Serres’s later work this critique gets further extended to other issues, mainly 
in two ways. First of all, Serres notices that the nuclear winter is not our only 
worry, or not even our greatest one. Since Le contrat naturel (1990) the problem 
of climate change, and in more recent work the one of the Anthropocene have 
come to the foreground. Much inspired by his ontology and epistemology, he un-
derstands these problems as a resistance of objects against our current networks, 
our current political collective. The social contract has to be replaced by a natural 
contract:
We so-called developed nations are no longer fighting among ourselves; together 
we are all turning against the world. Literally a world war, and doubly so, since the 
whole world, meaning all men, imposes losses on the world, meaning things. We 
shall thus seek to conclude a peace treaty.77
This ecological problem is fundamentally linked with another of Serres’s con-
cerns, namely the idea that our current way of doing and describing science is 
problematic, since it does not acknowledge the role objects play in science and 
society. The ecological crisis is just the clearest example of how by dividing sci-
ence and culture, we are unable to account for the political consequences of sci-
ence. In Statues Serres uses the example of the Challenger accident, the spaceship 
that exploded and killed all seven passengers.78 One could argue that this was a 
mere accident, but in fact, Serres claims it is no accident, but an essential element 
of science itself. We could have statistically predicted that such accidents would 
occur, similar to how we know that driving cars will imply traffic accidents. We ac-
cept these sacrifices, and find them necessary in order for our society to function, 
similar to how in mythical societies we have found it necessary to sacrifice per-
sons for the gods, or select a scapegoat to restore social order. Choosing for our 
current way of doing science, means accepting these sacrifices. Worse even, we 
deem them necessary, otherwise our society would fall apart. To do epistemology, 
philosophy of science, one should also be concerned with this kind of violence in 
science and seek for a less lethal alternative. What Serres has in mind, then, is a 
political project: how to respect this open element of Bachelard, but at the same 
time conceptualize a new politics of science, free from the burden of a conception 
such as rationalism? Serres believes that this can be done by following the model 
of proliferation. In this sense, his epistemological model is a political model as 
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well, but a more explicit one. 
CONCLUSION
This paper has tried to show how the work of Michel Serres must be seen not as 
an ‘epistemological break’ with Bachelard, but rather as a specific and critical con-
tinuation of certain of its methodological elements. Once again, the claim is not 
that there are no serious disagreements between both authors. They clearly have 
a different ontology and notions such as rationalism are differently evaluated. But 
at the same time Serres’s work can be read in line with some of Bachelardian no-
tions such as philosophie du non and surrationalism. To do so, one has to look at 
Serres’s early work, where he tries to develop a new new scientific spirit, updating 
Bachelard’s new scientific spirit. But besides mere epistemological corrections, this 
also implied a shift in the role of the philosopher, who has to open him- or herself 
to political issues following from science. These shifts have been quite radical, so 
much so that Serres’s recent work is often quite distinct from what one should 
associate with Bachelard and the tradition of French historical epistemology. But 
the claim is that this shift itself was, at least partly, brought about (wittingly or 
unwittingly) by a certain loyalty to Bachelard’s surrationalism. It was precisely 
due to the insights Serres found in the new new scientific spirit, which opened up 
room for imagination and culture in science, that he saw the need for a political 
dimension of philosophy of science.
It is possible to argue that a similar move is also at work in the oeuvre of Latour 
and Stengers. They agree that it is the scientific field that should decide which 
distinctions are relevant and which are not, and philosophers “should be as unde-
cided as the various actors we follow as to what technoscience is made of; to do 
so, every time an inside/outside division is built, we should follow the two sides 
simultaneously, making up a list, no matter how long and heterogeneous, of all 
those who do the work.”79 This is Latour’s famous dictum of ‘follow the actors,’ 
which can be interpreted acroding to the lines of Bachelard’s surrationalism. A 
similar rule can be found in the work of Isabelle Stengers, whe she aims at giving 
a description of the scientific practices that does not insult the scientists them-
selves.80 Both authors, however, follow Serres in stressing the importance of the 
political aspect, which remains underdeveloped in Bachelard’s work. To explore 
these aspects, however, a new paper would be required.81 Here, simply the possi-
bility of this rereading of their work can be noted. Again, one should not be misled 
by their claims that they fully break with Bachelard. Rather—through their con-
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nection via Serres—one can see their work as loyal to his legacy.
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